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Michael Wreen, "I n 
Ethics & Animals V/3, 
Speciesism 
Those of us who have become con­
vinced tha,t nonhuman animals are 
morally consider'able rights-bearers 
have frequently relied on the rejection 
of speciesism in our arguments with 
our opponents. If certain humans 
with impa ired menta I capacities have 
rights, we have urged, nonhuman 
animals with comparable capacities 
must have rights too. To deny rights 
to the latter is to assume that spec­
ies-membership is morally relevant 
("speciesism")-an assumption just as 
indefensible as racism or sexism. 
According to Michael Wreen, however, 
we are mistaken: the rejection of 
speciesism is unwarranted. 
Wreen I S importa nt cha lIenge, in his 
"In Defense of Speciesism,"l is sub­
tle, interesting, and laced with a 
powerful moral appeal to justice. 
Nevertheless, I wi II a rg ue here that 
he fails to make his case. In particu­
la r, the appeal to justice at the hea rt 
of his argument is an appeal which is 
simply not avai lable to him. 
The issues here are complex 
enough to warrant some preliminary 
distinctions. Presumably everyone 
agr'ees that if anyone has basic 
rights, including a right to life, a 
person does. Although he does not 
explicate the concept of personhood, 
Wreen r~fers us to Joel Feinberg's 
analysis. A person in the purely 
descriptive sense is an individual who 
is self-aware, sentient, capable of 
emotions, able to learn, reason, and 
plan. 2 Personhood is defined in terms 
of mental capacities. For the sake of 
argument, let us now make two 
assumptions, the first relatively 
uncontroversial and the second (to my 
mind) dubious. Suppose (1) that all 
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individuals who are persons have 
basic rights, including the right to 
life. Suppose further (2) that any 
set of mental capacities possessed by 
an individual which falls short of 
those characterizing pel'sonhood is not 
in itself sufficient to warrant the 
ascription of basic rights to that indi­
vidual (I will question this assumption 
later). Now, it is a ·matter of contin­
gent fact that, while most humans are 
persons, some are not. What would 
the moral status (if any) of these 
human nonpersons be? 
At this point, I suggest we distin­
guish humans who are potential per­
sons from those who are not. Just 
how this is to be done, and just who 
is to count as a potential person, are 
notoriously difficult problems which I 
am not foolish enough to try to solve 
here. There does, however, seem to 
be an impol'tant moral difference 
between an individual who will soon be 
a person and one who can never' be 
one. Perhaps individuals who are or 
will be persons qualify for basic 
rights. (Feinberg rejects this on the 
g rou nd that potential possession of 
rights is not actual possession of 
rights,3 but, as Wreen rightly points 
out, the suggestion is that actual or 
potential personhood is sufficient for 
actual possession of rights. 4 ) Let us 
set humans who are potential persons 
aside for the purpose of this discus­
sion, then. I will argue that even if 
potential persons are excluded from 
the class of problem cases, speciesism 
fails to be justified. 
There are humans who a re not and 
never will be persons, such as the 
severely brain-damaged. If their 
mental capacities do not in themselves 
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I'rant the of basic rightswa t ascription 
to them, and if no other characteristic 
they have is sufficient to warrant 
bas ic I'ights them, these huma nt for 
nonpel'sons are (and never willt not 
be) rights-bearers. The implications 
of this view al'e shocking to many of 
us, but a gl"owing number of philoso­
phel"s appear' accept them. Con­t to 
sider' a twist on the Baby Fae case. 
Assume that the baby has a right to 
life because she is a potential person .. 
On the view being discussed, not only 
wou ld there be noth i ng wrong in 
using a severely retarded human 
infant as a heal'tt  donor (resulting in 
its death) for the mentally normal 
baby: we might even be obi igated to 
do it. (Let us suppose that we harm 
no normal human-e.g., the r"etardedt  
baby's parents-by our actions.) If, 
however, we were to refuse to use the 
retarded baby's heart on the ground 
that the baby is human, and use the 
heal'tt  of a nonhuman nonperson 
instead (assuming that this will not 
significantly increase the risk for the 
normal baby), we would be guilty of 
indefensible speciesism. 5 (People who 
really accept speciesism are of course 
unmoved by anti-speciesism arguments 
from supporters of animal rights.) 
An alternative is to propose that 
human nonpersons do after all have a 
characteristic sufficient to warrant the 
ascription of basic rights to them: 
membership in a species in which per­
sonhood is the norm. Wreen defends 
this proposal in his paper by making 
two appeals: an appeal to metaphysics 
(or "quasi-metaphysics") and an 
appeal· to fai rness. I wi IIll con s idel't  
each in turn. 
Beginning, reasonably enough, 
from the human point of view, Wreen 
argues that "thel"e is a quasi-meta­
physical linkage between the concepts 
of a person and a human being. "6 
Wreen suggests' that the two concepts 
al"e "cdteriologically Thet related." 
relationship goes something like this: 
(I P) [I dentification Pri nciple] It 
is a necessary truth that the 
statement 'X is a live human 
being' is good evidence for the 
statement 'X is a human per­
son. '7 
It seems to follow, he says, "though 
this must be taken with caution, that 
there is an intimate connection 
between basic rights, such as a right 
to life, and humanity, here taken 
biologically. "8 
There al"et  several serious objec­
tions to this "quasi-metaphysical" 
appeal, some of which Wreen antici­
pates. First, (IP) is not really 
defended by Wreen. He says it is It a 
near relative" of a· principle defended 
by other authors; viz., "it is a nec­
essary truth that bodily identity is 
evidence for personal identity." 9. How 
is (I P), according to which "it is a 
necessary truth that 'X is a live 
human being' is good evidence for ·X 
is a human person'," a "near relative" 
of this principle? Surely the 'identi­
ty' referred to by the bodily-personal 
identity pl"inciplet  is not the same as 
'identification' in (IP)." I  . Inthe  the 
former case, we are speaking of iden­
tity in the sense of 'sameness;' in the 
case of (I P), the recognition 
("identification") of personhood is the 
issue. Wreen himself notes that the 
personal identity criterion concerns 
"re- identification" rather than "identi­
fication," but he fails to provide the 
very sepa rate justification needed for 
(I P) . Fu rthermore, (IP) is qu ite.   
implausible on the face of it. It is 
easy enough to imagine a world in 
which 'X is a live human being' is not 
good evidence for 'X is a human per­
son. I How, then, can the evidential 
claim be a necessary truth? Finally, 
suppose that we even accept (I P): 
what would it show? At best it would 
show that all live humans are pre­
sumptive persons. This presumption 
is obviously not sufficient for the 
ascription of basic rights to human 
nonpersons (assuming, as Wreen does 
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but I do not, that persons are the 
primary po~sessors of basic rights). 
These human nonpersons are readily 
identifiable. Wreen is well aware of 
this problem: 
This, of cour'se, is not to 
establish that there is a link­
age [between the concepts of a 
person and of a human being] 
enough to support the flow, so 
to speak, of basic rights into 
human beings per se. 10 
Why, then, invoke this "quasi-meta­
physical" linkage in the first place? 
At this point, I will hazard a guess 
as to why Wreen invokes a principle 
wh ich he knows very well to be too 
weak to support speciesism. 
T h rough0 ut his art icIe, he st r'esses 
the importance of ou r abi Iity to iden­
tify with human nonpersons. We are 
able to imagine ourselves in the oth­
er's place, to see ourselves, as it 
were, as being those humans. 'Iden­
tification' in this sense is really empa­
thy (not to be confu sed with sympa­
thy). (Since this sense of 
'identification' is utterly different from 
that of 'identification' in (I P), I will 
call it 'psychological identification' in 
contexts where ambiguity might other­
wise result.) Wreen holds that we 
have no comparable ability to identify 
with human nonpersons. Often, it 
quite true that we restrict ou r empa­
thy to humans. E.g., if Baby Fae 
had had two equally suitable live 
heart donors, one a human nonperson 
and the other a nonhuman nonperson, 
most human persons would only iden­
tify with the former. Wreen hopes to 
use metaphysics to legitimize this 
one-sided psychological propensity. 
After introducing (I P), he has this to 
say: 
For it would seem, first, that 
there is at least a quasi-meta­
physical linkage between the 
concepts of a person and a 
human being, and second, that 
ou r abi Iity to identify with 
human non-persons in a way 
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that we seem not to identify 
with sentient and intelligent 
non-human non-persons thus 
has a solid metaphysical 
basis. 11 
This will not do, ·however. How can a 
"quasi;..metaphysical linkage" provide 
"a solid metaphysical basis"? The 
"necessity" which allegedly relates the 
concepts of pet'son and of human 
being does not begin to be necessary 
enough to do this job--even if it does 
obtain, which is doubtful-especially in 
view of the two very different· senses 
of 'identification' in use her'e. 
Wreen is correct, though, in 
stressing the moral psy­importance of 
chological identification. Withol.Jt 
empathy, how could one take the 
moral poi nt of view? On the other 
hand, one must be extremely wary 
about using this capacity selectively. 
It is, of course, easier to identify 
with those most similar to us and 
familiar to us. This tendency is both 
psychologically understandable and 
morally suspect. It is the root of 
bigotry. The problem is not that one 
cqnnot identify with those· who are 
different and unfamiliar: one simply 
doesn't bother. One dismisses them 
beforehand as unworthy of our con­
sideration. Joseph Mengele, for 
example, was reportedly fond of the 
"Aryan" children of a couple who 
shielded him in Brazil, but he had no 
compu nctions about tortu ring and 
exterminating Jewish children. They 
were simply experimental subjects to 
him ("objects" would be a better 
term), expendable, "worthless" (apart 
from their research value, that is) 
lives. There is no reason to believe 
that he derived pleasu re from thei r 
sufferi ng: they simply did not matter 
to him as individuals. 
A great. many humans take the 
same attitude toward nonhuman animals 
as Mengele took toward Jews. While 
(one hop·es) relatively few humans 
refuse to identify with unfortunate 
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human nonpersons, few also bother to 
identify with members of other spec­
ies. Yet, with only a bit of thought, 
it is just as natural and automatic to 
identify with nonhuman animals 
(whether~ or not they al"e persons) as 
with humans. We read about baby 
seals stunned by steel-tipped clubs, 
skinned alive and tossed aside to die 
as their bellowing mothers helplesslY 
watch. It would be very difficult not 
to identify with these animals. A 
simi la r~ fate cou Id have been ou t~S, had 
we been Afghani children bludgeoned 
to death or bu rned to death by Soviet 
soldiers, or the parents forced to 
watch. ·We ,~ead about nonhuman lab­
orator'y animals who have poisons 
smeared into their eyes, vaginas, or 
rectums. Is it rea Ily d ifficu It to 
identify with these animals? Had we 
been inmates of Auschwitz whom Men­
gele had decided to "spare" for his 
experiments, the same fate could have 
been ours. I submit, contrary to 
Wreen, that we can identify with such 
nonhuman animals in the same way in 
which we do with human animals. The 
only effort needed is the effort 
requir'ed to become awar'e of the facts. 
Thus, I don't object to Wreen's 
str'ess on psychological identification;� 
. I object to the. limited scope he� 
. assigns it and to his (unsuccessful, I� 
have argued) attempt to pt'ovide a� 
metaphysical basis for that limited� 
scope. However, Wreen uses psycho­�
logical identification very effectively� 
. in the second part of his defense of 
speciesism: the appeal to fairness. 
Indeed, psychological identification is 
the link between the two parts of his 
argument. Let us now turn to the 
appeal to fairness. 
Wreen sketches three powerful 
examples of humans who are or who 
have become nonper'sons through no 
fault of their own: the friend who has 
had a terrible car accident (you 
almost rode with him), the fraternal 
twin who was born severely retarded 
(you are normal), and the childhood 
acquaintance who is now institutional­
ized (you are one of his doctors). We 
certainly do identify closely with suC;;h 
individuals. We are, as he says, 
keenly aware of how unlucky they 
have been-and how lucky, by con­
trast, we are. This is the signifi­
cance of psychological identification: it 
brings home to us the essential 
"u nfai rness" of such situation s. 
W,'een concludes that: 
Human non-persons, then, 
should be ascribed basic 
rights; for although in the 
primary case it is persons who 
are ascribed basic rights, 
equality of opportunity, or, 
better, fairness, requires us 
to ascribe basic rights to 
human nonpersons as well. 12 
Ascribing basic rights to human non­
persons is "due restitution for such a 
fu ndamental inj ustice; " 13 it is "com­
pensation for having been denied per­
son hood," 14 according to Wreen. This 
cannot be said of nonhuman nonper­
sons who belong to a species in which 
personhood is not the norm. "Foul 
fortune" did not prevent the shark 
from becoming a person; the shark 
would not have been a shark if it had 
been a person. To retu rn to my 
example, the living human nonperson 
whose heart could be transplanted into 
a human person has been dealt an 
injustice by the "Cosmos", Wreen 
wou Id say; the nonperson who belongs 
to a species of nonpersons has not. 
Therefore the latter, not the former, 
should be used as the organ qonor 
(assuming both organs would be 
equally suitable); speciesism in this 
sense, Wreen concludes, is justified. 
Wreen's examples are compelling 
and his plea for justice moving, but 
there are serious difficulties in his 
a rg ument-at least one of them fatal. 
Fi rst, at most Wreen has made .a 
case for the ascription of basic rights 
to those human nonpersons whose 
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condition IS no fault of their' own. 
Although Wreen states that there is 
little or nothing we can do to prevent 
the loss of our personhood,ls this is 
often not the case. Consider the vic­
tim of an unsuccessful suicide attempt 
who is now conscious but perma­
nently, severely brain damaged. Or 
consider the Hollywood stu nt per­
fOI'mer who ma kes a ca reer out of 
dan g e ro usstunt sand los es his 0 r her 
personhood as a result. Less dra­
matic cases abou nd. What about the 
individual who is too fond of fatty 
foods and physical inactivity to ward 
off atheroscler'osis, becoming senile as 
a result? Or the motorcyclist who 
refuses to wear a helmet? Or the 
driver or passenger who doesn't wear 
a seat belt? These human nonpersons 
don't have a right to Iife on Wreen' s 
view. I for one find this thoroughly 
counter-intuitive (unless the individu­
als have become brain dead or irre­
versibly comatose 16) . 
Second, Wreen himself raises the 
objection that his conceptual frame­
work appears incoherent. What sense 
does it make to talk about the unfair­
ness or injustice of nature or the uni­
verse, or' about basic rights being 
accorded as restitution or compensa­
tion for such injustice? If there were 
"A Supreme Court of Justice of the 
Cosmos" this would be intelligible, but 
as far as we know there is none. I 
don't think Wreen takes this objection 
nearly seriously enough. He replies 
that the terms he uses a re merely 
"convenient and vivid" metaphors 
which are used by "all" those who 
employ the concept of basic rights. 17 
I find this hard to believe: surely 
there are proponents of basic rights 
who do not personify nature, let alone 
at critical points in their arguments. 
It ma kes perfectly good sense to 
speak of persons respecting the rights 
of others and compensating them when 
their rights are violated; indeed, as 
Ernest Partridge puts it, "the very 
concept of 'morality' presupposes 
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personhood [i.e., mor'al agency]."18 
If Wreen's metaphors really are mere 
conveniences and their implicit 
anthropomorphism "not - inextirpable", 
he needs to show us how to cast his 
argument in a conceptually coherent 
way. Then he. wou Id be entitled to 
use these metaphors. 
Suppose Wreen could handle this 
second objection, however'. He would 
still face a third, and fatal, objection: 
circularity. He argues that human 
nonperson s s hou Id be ascr'ibed bas ic 
rights as restitution for the injustice 
dealt to them by nature: 
Basic morality, per'haps natural 
law, ensures at least the mini­
mum of fairness here, and 
r'edr'esses the mOI'a! balance, 
makes up for nature's inhu­
manity to humanity, by 
according basic rights. 19 
This implies that human nonpersons 
have the r'ight to fai rness (equated 
with justice), to "equality of oppot'tu­
nity"20 or "a fair chance"21 of becom­
ing and remaining a pet'son. When 
wrongfu Ily dep rived of th is "bi rth­
l'ight"22 they are due basic rights as 
compensation. However', this argu­
ment plainly presupposes that they 
al ready have a basic right: the r'ight 
to fairness or justice. Wreen's appeal 
to justice for, e.g., the Down's Syn­
drome twin brother, seems so moving 
because we assume such an individual 
has rights. This assumption may be 
true-I think that it is-but Wreen can­
not use it as a premise in his ar'gu­
ment. This is the very conclusion he 
must establish. 
Could Wreen's argument be recast 
in a noncircular way? Suppose he 
were to g ra nt at the outset that 
human nonpersons are morally consid­
erable-not, of cou rse, by vi rtue of 
their humanity, but by virtue of their 
sentience or potential sentience, or 
some other non-speciesist characteris­
tic-and have some rights. The rights 
they have, he could say, are those 
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commensurate with their capacities 
(e.g., the r~ight not to have unneces­
sary suffer';ng inflicted on them). 
But, he could argue, these capacities 
by themselves are insufficient for a 
1
right to life. 23 Could Wreen argue 
that one of the rights they do possess 
is the right to an equal opportunity, 
or "afail~ chance," to become and 
4 emain persons, and that we owe them 
the right to life as compensation for 
the denial of their "fair chance?" I 
think not. The right to an equal 
opportunity for bec.oming and remain­
ing a pel~son presupposes a I~ight to 
life-for without the lattel~ right, the 
for·mer could never be exercised. 
Although the right not to be caused 
gt~atuitous suffering is not violated by 
painless, fearless death, the right to 
a fair chance at being and remaining a 
person certainly would be. 
Therefore, speciesism has not been 
justified. Those who believe that the 
mental capacities of a h uma n non per­
son are not sufficient to wal~rant the 
ascription of basic l~ights, or a right 
to life, to that individual are morally 
inconsistent if they give preference to 
him 0 r her. over a non human' non per­
son. 
But should we accept the assump­
tion that only persons (and maybe 
potential per~sons) have a right to 
life? If we do, ironically, it may well 
be the case that many nonhuman ani­
mals will qualify for this right while 
some sentient humans will not. Etho­
logists have recently provided evi­
dence for the person hood, in Fe; n­
ber~g's descl~iptive sense, of many 
nonhuman animals-not just apes, dol­
phins, and whales. 24 If "those 
bei ngs who a re con sciou s, have a 
concept and awareness of themselves, 
are capable of experiencing emotions, 
can reason and acquire understand­
ing, can plan ahead, can act on their 
plans, and can feel pleasure or pain" 
al~e persons, the "moral club" very 
probably needs to be open to menibers 
of many other species. If these writ­
ers are correct, many nonhuman ani­
mals have capacities which fal~ outstrip 
those of certain humans. Indeed, an 
animal whose capacities were equiva­
lent to those of humans with advanced 
Alzheimer's Disease could not survive 
in nature. 
Howeve r, I bel ieve it wou Id be a 
major mistake to deny that such 
human nonpel~sons have a right to 
life. These beings are conscious and 
self-aware enough-if on Iy for brief 
periods-to have lives wh ich matter to 
them (positively or negatively) in 
some sense. They need not think of 
themselves in sophisticated terms to 
be individuals with interests. To use 
Tom Regan's phrase, they are "sub­
jects of lives," lives which have 
value-to them, although again not 
necessarily in sophisticated terms-in­
dependently of anyone else's inter­
ests. 25 I will not repeat Regan's 
arguments here, but I do want to 
express my agreement: lives like these 
al~e not expendable. 26 
Rega rd less of how one decides 
upon the proper criteria for having a 
right to life, however, one thing 
seems correct. Species membership 
has not yet been shown to be a mor­
ally relevant consideration in that 
decision. 
Evelyn B. Pluhar 
Pennsylvania State University, Fayette 
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